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Abstract
Today’s permissioned blockchain systems come in a stand-alone fashion and require the
users to integrate yet another full-fledged transaction processing system into their already
complex data management landscape. This seems odd as blockchains and traditional DBMSs
share large parts of their processing stack. Thus, rather than replacing the established data
systems altogether, we advocate to simply ‘chainify ’ them with a blockchain layer on top.
Unfortunately, this task is far more challenging than it sounds: As we want to build
upon heterogenous transaction processing systems, which potentially behave differently, we
cannot rely on every organization to execute every transaction deterministically in the same
way. Further, as these systems are already filled with data and being used by top-level
applications, we also cannot rely on every organization being resilient against tampering
with its local data.
Therefore, in this work, we will drop these assumptions and introduce a powerful process-
ing model that avoids them in the first place: The so-called Whatever-LedgerConsensus (WLC)
model allows us to create a highly flexible permissioned blockchain layer coined ChainifyDB
that (a) is centered around bullet-proof database technology, (b) makes even stronger guar-
antees than existing permissioned systems, (c) provides a sophisticated recovery mechanism,
(d) has an up to 6x higher throughput than the permissioned blockchain system Fabric, and
(e) can easily be integrated into an existing heterogeneous database landscape.
1 Introduction
The vast majority of modern permissioned blockchain systems (PBS) [16, 5, 7, 6, 3, 27, 18], in
which all organizations are known at any time, come as stand-alone end-to-end transaction pro-
cessing systems. As a consequence, an organization that wants to utilize blockchain technology
is currently forced to add yet another data management system to its infrastructure. However,
since this infrastructure typically already consists of various established systems, which are filled
with data and used by top-level applications, this approach is extremely troublesome. Data must
be migrated, applications must be rewritten, personnel must be retrained — in general, the inte-
gration and maintenance of a new full-fledged system is associated with high costs and immense
effort.
This raises the question, whether it is actually necessary to reinvent the wheel and design
blockchain systems in a stand-alone fashion in the first place. Large parts of the transaction
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processing stack are conceptually shared with traditional database management systems [30].
Why not simply reuse these parts and build upon them? Precisely, instead of replacing the
established database management systems altogether, we advocate to extend them with the
missing and desired blockchain functionality.
Unfortunately, this task is far more challenging than it sounds at first. This has to do with two
fundamental differences between stand-alone PBSs and our design.
First, due to their restrictive design, stand-alone PBSs can make the convenient assumption
that:
1) Every organization executes every transaction deterministically in the same way.
As every organization runs the very same storage system and the very same transaction pro-
cessing engine, it can be assumed comfortably that every transaction is interpreted in exactly
the same way and results in the same effect across all organizations. In contrast to that, in a
heterogeneous setup we don’t have the luxury to rely on this assumption. As one organization of
the network might build upon DBMS X while another one builds upon DBMS Y, the exact same
transaction could result in different effects across organizations. Reasons for this are manifold:
Systems might implement a different interpretation of the SQL standard or of the used data
types.
The second fundamental difference is that, due to their restrictive design, stand-alone PBSs can
assume that:
2) Every organization is resilient against tampering with its local data.
As stand-alone PBSs employ their own dedicated storage system, they fully control all access
that is happening to it. Thus, in practice, it is unlikely that the data is corrupted externally.
However, in our design we cannot make this assumption. As we want to utilize arbitrary database
systems containing various forms of data, which are accessed from top-level applications aside
from our blockchain layer, the chances of corruption are significantly higher in our case.
In summary, the processing model employed by the vast majority of stand-alone systems is obvi-
ously not powerful enough to handle the challenges of our highly flexible design. To understand
the precise problem and to come up with a new and more powerful model, let us inspect the
general workflow that is currently applied.
1.1 Order-Consensus-Execute
The model, that is currently implemented by the vast majority of stand-alone PBSs [16, 5, 7,
6, 3, 27, 18] is called order-consensus-execute (OCE). First, in the order-phase, an order on
a batch of transactions is proposed. Then, in the consensus-phase, the organizations try to
globally agree on this ordered batch using some sort of consensus mechanism. If a consensus is
reached, in the final execute-phase, the agreed-upon ordered batch is executed locally by every
organization. As a result, all honest organizations reach the same state.
The problem lies in the assumption, that if a consensus is reached on the result of the order-phase,
every honest organization will be in the same state after the execution-phase. In other words,
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Figure 1: The order-consensus-execute model (OCE). The consensus-phase sits between the order-phase
and the execute-phase. As a consequence of this design, assumptions must be made on everything after
the consensus-phase, namely on the execute-phase.
it assumes that everything goes well after the consensus-phase. Figure 1 visualizes the problem:
OCE assumes deterministic behavior on anything happening after the consensus-phase, namely
on the execute-phase.
Unfortunately, th s as umption is not compatible with our design as we want to chainify het-
erogeneous infrastructures, that potentially be ave differently and that are potentially prone to
tampering with the data.
1.2 Whatever-LedgerConsensus
To eliminate the need for assumptions, we argue that the consensus-phase must be pushed
towards the end of the processing pipeline. Figure 2 shows the effect of doing so, resulting in the
order-execute-consensus model (OEC). If we reach consensus on the effects of the execute-phase
instead of reaching consensus on the order established by the order-phase, no assumptions must
be made on the order-phase and execute-phase.
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Figure 2: The order-execute-consensus model (OEC). The consensus-phase sits at the end of the pipeline,
after both order-phase and the execute-phase. As consensus is reached on the effects of the execute-phase,
no assumptions must be made on any previous phase.
From this perspective, we are actually able to abstract from the concrete order-phase and the
execute-phase: Whatever happens in these phases, we are able to detect all differences in the
produced effects in the consensus-phase afterwards.
This results in a new, highly flexible processing model we call the Whatever-LedgerConsensus
model or WLC for short (pronounced “We’ll see!”). Figure 3 visualizes the two phases of our
WLC model:
1. Whatever-phase. Each organization does whatever it deems necessary to pass the LC-
phase later on.
3
2. LedgerConsensus-phase. We perform a consensus round on the effects of the whatever-
phase to check whether a consensus can be reached on them. If yes, the effects are com-
mitted to a ledger. If an organization is non-consenting, it must perform a recovery. If no
consensus is reached at all, all organizations must try to recover.
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Figure 3: Our Whatever-LedgerConsensus model (WLC). We do not make assumptions on the behavior
of the whatever-phase. In the consensus-phase, consensus is reached on the effects of the whatever-phase.
This WLC model finally allows us to design and implement our highly flexible permissioned
blockchain system: ChainifyDB. It supports different transaction processing systems across
organizations to build a heterogeneous blockchain network.
1.3 Contributions
1. We present a new processing model coined the Whatever-LedgerConsensus model
(WLC). In contrast to existing processing models, our model does not make any assump-
tions on the behavior of the local engines. Still, we are able to detect any deviation of
an organization, irrespective of the cause. Our model allows us to realize highly flexible
blockchain systems while being able to express existing models like OCE as special cases.
2. We present the Whatever Recovery Landscape and discuss the different classes of
recovery algorithms possible in the WLC model, depending on the amount of information
available regarding actions and effects.
3. We present a concrete system instance of WLC coined ChainifyDB. We start with a set
of heterogeneous database systems and show how to connect them to a network providing
permissioned blockchain-properties. We only requires the DBMSs providing a trigger
mechanism as defined in SQL 99 or similar.
4. We show initial results with a vendor-independent recovery algorithm allowing
ChainifyDB to efficiently recover non-consenting organizations. Notice that systems like
Fabric [7] do not have any recovery mechanism.
5. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation of ChainifyDB in comparison
with the comparable state-of-the-art permissioned blockchain systems Fabric [7] and Fab-
ric++ [30] and achieve an up to 6x higher throughput. Further, we show that ChainifyDB
is able to fully utilize the performance of the underlying database systems and demonstrate
its robustness and recovery capabilities experimentally.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we first discuss related works, which sit at
the intersection of databases and blockchains and contrast WLC and ChainifyDB to them from
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a conceptual perspective. In Section 3, we formalize our Whatever-LedgerConsensus model
(WLC). In Section 4, we present the Whatever Recovery Landscape. In Section 5, we present
the logical design of ChainifyDB and its components, including the recovery mechanism. In
Section 6, we present interesting optimizations possible in ChainifyDB. In Section 7, we present
concrete implementation details of ChainifyDB. Finally, in Section 8, we perform an extensive
experimental evaluation.
2 Related Work
As stated, the vast majority of permissioned blockchain systems implement variants of the OCE
model, with [5, 6, 3, 27, 18] being prominent examples. Even Fabric [7, 11], which uses a model
the authors call execute-order-validate, implements in the end a form of OCE: In the execute-
phase, the effect of transactions are computed. After ordering the transactions, the effects of
non-conflicting transactions are used to update the state in the given order. Thus, the validate-
phase in Fabric highly resembles the execute-phase in OCE. Interestingly, none of these system
integrate any form of recovery mechanism: As soon as an organization deviates, it is considered
as being malicious independent of the cause and implicitly banned from further transaction
processing.
Apart from the execution model, there are other projects that sit at the intersection of databases
and blockchains. In [27], the authors extend the relational system PostgreSQL with blockchain
features. This results in a “blockchain relational database”, which is capable of performing
trusted transactions between multiple PostgreSQL instances. While this project is clearly a step
in the right direction, it does not go far enough: the blockchain relational database still comes in a
stand-alone fashion and forces the users to integrate a whole new system into their infrastructure.
Further, they heavily modify the internals of PostgreSQL to integrate the blockchain features.
In contrast to that, in ChainifyDB we install the blockchain features on-top of blackbox DBMSs
without changing them in any way. We intended to compare ChainifyDB against this system,
however, the source code is not available.
A project with a similar attitude is BlockchainDB [18, 19]. In contrast to [27] and to Chaini-
fyDB, the authors of [18, 19] install a database layer on top of an existing blockchain, such
as Ethereum [1] or Hyperledger Fabric [7]. This database layer allows the user to manage and
access the underlying shared data in a more convenient way than directly communicating with
the blockchain system. Unfortunately, the comfort is relatively limited: To support a variety of
blockchain systems, the authors have to stick to a key-value data model and a simple put()/get()
query interface.
Another project at the intersection of databases and blockchains is Veritas [21]. This visionary
paper also proposes to extend existing database systems by blockchain features; however, they
focus on a cloud infrastructure. To synchronize instances, they utilize log shipping. Therefore,
this solution requires the underlying database system to provide log shipping in the first place
and disallows the connection of different database systems in one network, if their log shipping
mechanisms are not compatible with each other. Of course, they are not in general.
The project ChainSQL [26] takes the open-source blockchain system Ripple [8] and integrates
relational and NoSQL databases into the storage backend. This enables it to run SQL-style
respectively JSON-style transactions. However, by integrating database systems into the heavy-
weight blockchain system Ripple, the authors limit the transaction processing performance to
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that of Ripple — thus overshadowing the high performance of the underlying database sys-
tems. In contrast to that, ChainifyDB is designed from the get-go to leverage the power of
the underlying systems — in particular using highly parallel transaction execution, even across
heterogeneous database systems.
The project BigchainDB [5] combines the blockchain framework Tendermint [4] with the docu-
ment store MongoDB and therefore extends it with blockchain features. In contrast to Chaini-
fyDB, the system is shipped in a stand-alone fashion and focuses on the query interface of
MongoDB.
Apart from works aiming at closing the gap between databases and blockchains from an archi-
tectural perspective, there is a considerable amount of research improving the performance of
permissioned blockchains. In [30], [22], [13], and [24], the authors apply various optimizations
to improve the throughput of successful transactions in Fabric.
3 Whatever-Ledger Consensus
Let us now start by introducing our novel process model Whatever-Ledger Consensus (WLC)
and formalize it.
3.1 Core Idea
In short, the core idea of WLC is to not seek consensus on what should be done-actions, but
rather seek consensus on the effect of the actions after they have been performed. This allows
us to drop assumptions on the concrete transaction processing behavior of the organizations. It
also allows us to detect any external tampering with the data. The WLC model implies that if
consensus on the effects of certain actions cannot be reached, the organizations must not commit
the effects of their actions.
Note that WLC is also more powerful than classical 2PC or 3PC-style protocols in the sense
that they still assume deterministic behavior of the organizations without looking back at the
produced effects. In WLC, we simply do not care about whether organizations claim to be
prepared for a transaction and what they claim to commit. In contrast, we solely look at the
outcome. If we can reach consensus on the outcome, it does not matter anymore which actions
those organizations used to get to the same outcome in the first place.
In summary, we measure the outcome rather than the promises.
3.2 Processing Model
In the following, let us formalize WLC in detail.
Let O1, . . . , Ok be the k participating organizations in the network. As always, these organiza-
tions do not trust each other. Still, they want to perform a mutual sequence of inputs, which
is fed into the system batch-wise round by round, as visualized in Figure 3. The following
description shows the W-phase and the LC-phase in round t.
Whatever-phase. Note that although the same sequence of inputs enters the system, each
organization might actually receive a potentially different set of actions for processing, as we
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do not make any assumptions on what exactly is happening in the W-phase. For instance, an
ordering service could distribute different actions to different organizations for whatever reason.
Thus, we define Al,1, . . . , Al,t as the sequence of actions, that the individual organization Ol
receives till round t.
Effect Functions: Further, we assume that there is an effect function Fl(). Only if the effect
contains the state, an action can be applied on the effect to generate a new effect. We compute
for each organization Ol the accumulated effect El,t as:
El,t = Fl(El,t−1, [Al,t])
with El,0 = ∅ being the initial empty effect. Notice the iterative construction of this function
(which will later on create our blockchain-style chaining of effects):
El,t = Fl(Fl(Fl(. . .), [Al,t−1]), [Al,t]).
Notice that we use El,t = Fl(∅, [Al,1, . . . , Al,t]), as a shorthand, still there will be a separate effect
function call for each of the t actions.
LedgerConsensus-phase. On the accumulated effects El,t for 1 ≤ l ≤ k, a consensus must
be reached (and not necessarily on the entire state!). Otherwise, the system is not allowed to
proceed to round t + 1. To decide whether consensus is reached, a consensus policy c specifies
how many organization must at least have reached the same accumulated effect. Thus, consensus
in round t is reached if
∃Ocons = {Oi, ..., Oj} : |Ocons| ≥ c : (Ei,t = . . . = Ej,t) = Econs,t.
We summarize the effect on which consensus has been reached as Econs,t. If consensus has been
reached, each organization Ol has to decide on its own whether its local effect El,t matches
the consensus effect Econs,t. If it matches, the effect can be committed to a ledger and round t
ends. Otherwise, Ol can not proceed to round t+ 1 and tries to recover. If no consensus can be
reached at all, i.e. Econs,t = undefined, then no organization can proceed to round t+ 1. In this
case, all organizations try to recover. We will discuss in Section 4 the detailed recovery behavior
and introduce a concrete database vendor-independent recovery algorithm in Section 5.
4 Whatever Recovery
Actions
not accessible accessible (blackbox) accessible (whitebox)
Effects
State not contained — + full replay + optimized full replay
State contained + restore state + partial replay + optimized partial replay
Table 1: The 2 × 3 Whatever Recovery Landscape. The two-dimensions of Whatever recovery (accessi-
bility of effects vs actions) and their implications on the classes of recovery algorithms possible
Let us now see how we perform recovery and what levels of recovery are actually possible in the
WLC model.
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4.1 Non-Consenting Organization Scenario
As described formally in Section 3.2, we must perform recovery on an organization Ol if El,t 6=
Econs,t. The reasons for this are multitude: It could be that Ol simply interpreted Al,t differently
than the others or that non-determinism is hidden in Al,t. It could also be that someone, e.g.
an administrator, tampered with El,t.
Irrespective of the cause, during recovery, we have to compute a new effect E′l,t. If E
′
l,t 6= El,t,
then the computed effect differs from the original effect, which was used for consensus, and Ol
has a chance to recover. If now E′l,t = Econs,t, then Ol has recovered and can proceed with
round t + 1. If not, then it can not recover and is excluded from the network.
If no consensus has been reached at all, i.e. Econs,t = undefined, then we perform a new consensus
round on the new effects. The network can recover, if
∃O′cons = {Oi, ..., Oj} : |O′cons| ≥ c : E′i,t = . . . = E′j,t.
4.2 The 2 × 3 Recovery Landscape
There are tradeoffs and optimizations involved in practical recovery. For example, instead
of starting with an empty state and replaying the entire sequence of actions there are many
more options. Table 1 introduces the whatever recovery landscape. That landscape has two
dimensions Effects and Actions. For the dimension Effects, we distinguish between whether the
state is not contained and the state is contained. For the dimension Actions, we distinguish
between not accessible, blackbox actions (we have access but do not understand the semantics
in any way), and whitebox actions (we have access and understand the semanics, i.e. we see
the individual operations carried out). Like that we receive six different classes of recovery
algorithms. Note that each cell in that landscape includes all cells with weaker accessibility levels
(i.e. all cells that are further left and/or up). In the following we discuss each cell individually.
We label each subsection with a visual notation of its position in the whatever recovery landscape,
e.g. for (State: accessible, Actions: whitebox).
4.3 No Recovery
Accessibility: State: na, Actions: na.
If neither state nor actions are available to us, we cannot recover a non-consenting organization.
Recovery: —
4.4 Recovery from a State
Accessibility: State: contained, Actions: na.
We have access to the state computed by the individual organizations but do not understand
their semantics. As we don’t have access to actions, we cannot apply them in any way.
Recovery: In order to recover organization Ol in round t, we overwrite its local effect El,t with
the effect Ei,t of any other organization Oi 6=l, that is matching the consensus effect Econs,t
E′l,t = Fl(Ei,t, []).
If Econs,t = undefined, i.e. no consensus was reached in round t, then Ol cannot recover.
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4.5 Full Replay
Accessibility: State: na, Actions: blackbox.
The state is not contained, but we have access to the sequence of blackbox actions.
Recovery: In order to recover organization Ol in round t, we can (blindly) replay the entire
history of blackbox actions Al,1, . . . , Al,t from the very beginning to restore the accumulated
effect
E′l,t = Fl(∅, [Al,1, . . . , Al,t]).
If E′l,t = Econs,t, then Ol may rejoin the network.
4.6 Partial Replay from a State
Accessibility:
State: contained, Actions: blackbox.
The state is contained. Further, we have access to blackbox actions but do not understand their
semantics.
Recovery: In order to recover Ol in round t, we can perform a partial replay. In other words,
we start with an older effect El,s<t and partially replay the blackbox actions Al,s+1, . . . , Al,t
(redo in database lingo):
E′l,t = Fl(El,s<t, [Al,s+1, . . . , Al,t])
If E′l,t = Econs,t, then Ol may rejoin the network.
4.7 Optimized Full Replay
Accessibility:
State: na, Actions: whitebox.
The effect does not contain the state, but we have access to the sequence of whitebox actions
and understand the precise semantics of the actions.
Recovery: In order to recover organization Ol in round t, we can replay the entire history of
actions from the very beginning to restore the accumulated effect. However, as we have whitebox
actions available, we can also optimize the replay: For example, if we know that an action Al,t
consists of a sequence of three transactions Al,t = [T1, T2, T3], where all three transactions
update the same record, then we could safely drop T1 and T2 and use A
′
l,t = [T3] for the replay.
Further possible optimizations include changing the order of operations and to allow for parallel
execution of non-conflicting operations [35], as we show in Section 6.3. Thus, we restore the
effect using the optimized actions A′l,1, . . . , A
′
l,t:
E′l,t = Fl(∅, [A′l,1, . . . , A′l,t])
If E′l,t = Econs,t, then Ol may rejoin the network.
9
4.8 Optimized Partial Replay from a State
Accessibility:
State: contained, Actions: whitebox.
We have access to the state as well as access to whitebox actions.
Recovery: In order to recover Ol in round t, we start with an older effect El,s<t and partially
replay the optimized actions A′l,s+1, . . . , A
′
l,t (redo in database lingo):
E′l,t = Fl(El,s<t, [A
′
l,s+1, . . . , A
′
l,t])
If E′l,t = Econs,t, then Ol may rejoin the network.
4.9 Abstraction vs Implementation
Notice that we use the concepts of ‘effect’ and ‘action’ to abstract from the details of a concrete
implementation. For example, conceptually, it is not strictly necessary to physically materialize
an effect: Replaying the entire history of actions is sufficient to restore an effect. This is similar
to log-only databases (“the log is the database”) [17, 32, 33] that regard the database store as
a performance optimized representation of the database log.
In ChainifyDB, which we will describe in detail in the next section, effects are materialized in
form of database states and snapshots of those to enable high performance transaction processing
and recovery. Actions represent blocks of transactions, which modify the database state and
thereby generate new effects. Let us now see how it works in detail.
5 ChainifyDB
In Section 3 we have introduced and formalized our novel WLC model which is able to detect
deviation of effects without making any assumptions on the behavior of the whatever-phase. In
Section 4, we presented the different recovery options in the WLC landscape depending on the
accessibility of effects and actions.
In this section we present ChainifyDB, a concrete system that instantiates the WLC model. The
core feature of ChainifyDB is to equip established infrastructures, which already consist of several
database management systems, with blockchain functionality as a layer on top. The challenge
is that these infrastructures can be highly heterogeneous, i.e. every participant potentially runs
a different DBMS where each system can interpret a certain transaction differently. As a result,
the effects across participants might differ.
As mentioned earlier, the classical OCE model, which relies on the previously discussed strong
assumptions, is not capable of handling such a heterogeneous setup: The execution across par-
ticipants is neither guaranteed to be deterministic nor equal. In contrast to that, our WLC
model is perfectly suited to handle such heterogeneous scenarios, where no assumptions on the
behavior of the organizations are made.
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5.1 Overview on our WLC-Implementation
Let us now see in detail how we implement the W-phase as well as the LC-phase in ChainifyDB.
Just like our model, the implementation operates in rounds and consumes a batch of input
transactions, which have been proposed by clients to the system, in every round.
Whatever-phase. In its simplest variant, ChainifyDB instantiates the W-phase of the WLC
model with two subphases: the order-subphase and the execute-subphase. Figure 4 visualizes
the instantiation.
no assumptions
Whatever-phase
Order 
subphase
Execute 
subphase
Recovery 
subphase
Ledger Consensus-phase
Outcome 
Consensus
non-consenting nodes
consenting 
nodes
append to 
Ledger
batch 
of inputs 
of round t
Figure 4: ChainifyDB as a concrete instance of the Whatever-LedgerConsensus model (WLC).
Order-subphase. In the order-subphase of round t, a batch of input transaction is globally
ordered and grouped in a block. Note that an action in our earlier formalization resembles a
block of transactions here, i.e. Al,t = [T1, T2, T3]. Packing transactions into blocks is merely
a performance optimization in order to amortize the costs for consensus later on. There is no
conceptual need to form blocks. Notice that our order-subphase fully resembles the order-phase
in the classical OCE-model. However, in strong contrast to the OCE-model, we do not perform
a consensus round on the established order afterwards, even if we do not trust the ordering
service in any way. For now, we simply take whatever the ordering service outputs.
Execute-subphase. In the execute-subphase, each organization Ol receives an action Al,t =
[T1, T2, T3] produced by the order-phase. Each transaction of that block, that has valid signa-
tures, is then executed against the local relational database. This execution potentially updates
the database and thereby produces an effect El,t. In Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, we will outline
in detail how this effect looks like in ChainifyDB. For now, let us simply assume that the effect
captures all modifications done by the valid transactions of the block to the database.
Again, we want to point out that in contrast to the OCE-model, we do not assume determin-
istic execution across all organizations: The different DBMSs of two organizations could have
interpreted a transaction slightly differently or two organizations could have received different
blocks from the order-phase altogether.
LedgerConsensus-phase. In the ledger consensus phase, all organizations have to reach con-
sensus on the effects produced by the whatever-phase of the individual organizations. Thus, in
a consensus round, which we will describe in Section 5.4 in detail, the organizations first try to
agree on one particular effect. Then, each organization whose effect is consenting commits it to
its local ledger and proceeds with round t + 1. Again, only if consensus on an effect is reached,
we consider it as globally committed.
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Recovery-subphase. If the effect of an organization is non-consenting, the organization must at
least try to recover from this situation. This is done using a variant of Optimized Partial Replay
from a (Logical) Snapshot as introduced in Section 4. We will explain our recovery mechanism
in detail in Section 5.5.
5.2 Logical per Block Digests
In the previous section, we mentioned that the execution of a block on the local database pro-
duces an effect as a side-product of execution. On this effect, the consensus round is performed.
It is also eventually committed to the ledger. Thus, let us see in the following how we precisely
generate the effect.
block 42
Foo
PK A B C
1 43 q 3.4
2 67 b 1.2
3 88 k 7.8
4 87 i 5.6
5 12 q 3.2
6 16 c 1.9
initial state: after update on pk 4:
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Figure 5: Logical tuple-wise per block digest computation on an example table Foo. All changes are
automatically tracked and digested through SQL 99 triggers.
In ChainifyDB we assume SQL-99 compliant relational DBMSs to keep the state at each orga-
nization. This has two reasons: On the one hand, we want to allow for existing organizations
with existing DBMS-products to be able to easily build WLC-networks with blockchain-style
guarantees. On the other hand, we can utilize SQL 99 triggers to realize a vendor-independent
digest versioning mechanism, that specifically versions the data of ChainifyDB in form of a digest
table.
The digest table is computed per block. We instrument every shared table in our system with a
trigger mechanism to automatically populate this digest as follows: for every tuple changed by
an INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE-statement, we create a corresponding digest tuple. A digest tuple
has the following schema: [PK:<as of Foo>, serial:int, hash:int, T]. Here, PK is the primary
key of the original table (which may of course also be a compound key), serial is a strictly
monotonously rising counter used to distinguish entries with the same PK (every new version of
a tuple increases this counter), hash is the digest of the values of the tuple after it was changed
(for a delete: its state before removing it from the table), T is the type of change that was
performed, i.e. (I)nsert, (U)pdate or (D)elete. Notice that in contrast to recovery algorithms
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like ARIES [25], in those tuples we do not preserve the information how to undo/redo changes,
as we simply do not need that information.
Figure 5 shows an example how to process a block of three transactions: we start with a
particular state of table Foo and an empty digest table Foo Digest. Now, we perform an update
on tuple with PK=4. As a result, the tuple in Foo is changed to (4, 42, z, 7.9) and we insert a
new digest tuple (4, 0, 3B50, U) into Foo Digest. After that a delete of record with PK=3 is
performed. The tuple in Foo is deleted and we insert a new digest tuple (3, 0, B2F9, D) into
Foo Digest. We proceed until we processed all three transactions TA1–TA3 available in this
particular block. For the next block to process we start with an empty digest table.
5.3 LedgerBlocks
Although the digest table captures all changes done to a table by the last block of transactions,
it does not represent the effect yet. The actual effect is represented in form of a so called
LedgerBlock, which consists of the following fields:
1. TA list: The list of transactions that were part of this block. Each transaction is repre-
sented by its SQL code.
2. TA successful: A bitlist flagging the successfully executed transactions. This is important
as transactions may of course fail and that behavior should be part of consensus across all
organizations.
3. hash digest: A hash of the logical contents of the digest table. In our case, this is a
hash over the hash-values present in the diff table. The hash values are concatenated in
lexicographical [PK, serial]-order and then input into SHA256.
4. hash previous LedgerBlock: A hash value of the entire contents of the previous LedgerBlock
appended to the ledger, again in form of a SHA256 hash. This backward chaining of hashes
allows anyone to verify the integrity of the ledger in linear time.
This LedgerBlock now leaves the W-phase and enters the LC-phase to determine whether con-
sensus can be reached.
5.4 Consensus Algorithm
In our permissioned setup, we can safely make the assumption, that all organizations of the
network are known at any time and that no organization can join the network during a con-
sensus round. This allows us to use a lightweight voting algorithm for this purpose, instead of
having to rely on more heavyweight consensus algorithms such as [12, 37, 36, 29]. To determine
whether consensus was reached, a consensus policy c must be specified by all organizations in
advance during the bootstrapping process of the network. The constant c specifies how many
organizations must have reached the same effect.
Our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1 in the appendix and resembles the perspective of a single
organization.
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In the first step of the consensus algorithm, the individual organization has to count how often
each LedgerBlock occurred in the network. To do so, it requests the so called LedgerBlockHashes
from all other organizations and counts the occurrences, including its own local LedgerBlockHash.
This LedgerBlockHash is essentially a compressed form of the contents of a LedgerBlock.
Consensus is reached if two conditions hold: (a) There must be a LedgerBlockHash that occurred
at least c times. (b) This consensus LedgerBlockHash equals the local LedgerBlockHash. If both
hold, then the organization can append/commit its LedgerBlock to its local ledger.
5.5 Logical Checkpointing and Recovery
If an organization is non-consenting, it must enter recovery as outlined in Section 5.1 and
presented in Figure 4.
For recovery, ChainifyDB implements Optimized Partial Replay from a (Logical) Snapshot as
introduced in Section 4.8. Again, like the digests (see Section 5.2) our approach is DBMS-system
independent : we do not need access to the source code of the DBMS. The Figures 6 and 7 show
an example run of our checkpointing and recovery algorithm.
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Figure 6: ChainifyDB’s checkpointing mechanism. Here, a checkpoint is created after every three blocks.
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Figure 7: ChainifyDB’s Recovery using checkpoints. As block 46 is non-consenting it has to enter the
recovery phase. It will first try to recover using the most recent local checkpoint. This fails in this
example and hence recovery from an older checkpoint is performed.
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Figure 6 shows the normal operation mode of a single organization that is consenting: we create
a checkpoint by creating a snapshot of table Foo after every k blocks (k = 3 in the example).
Snapshots are created on the SQL-level through either a non-maintained materialized view or
by a CREATE TABLE command. If the source code of the DBMS and the operating system is
available, the snapshotting support from the operating system could be exploited at this point
as well [31, 23] – however, we do not make this assumption in our design. The snapshot is created
for all tables that were changed since the last consistent snapshot. Creating such a snapshot
is surprisingly fast: Snapshotting the accounts table with 1,000,000 rows, which is part of the
Smallbank [2] benchmark used in our experiment evaluation, takes only 827ms in total on our
machine of type 2 running PostgreSQL (see Section 8). Notice that there is no need to store
this checkpoint in the ledger, as done in ARIES [25] for instance: As the information contained
in a checkpoint can be fully recomputed from the ledger, it has to pass the LC-phase anyways
again.
Figure 7 shows an organization switching to recovery mode. This organization is in normal (con-
senting) mode for all blocks shown up to and including block 45. For block 46 this organization
is non-consenting. Hence, it must enter the recovery phase.
First, we have to reset Foo to the state of the latest consistent snapshot Foo block 44. Then,
we replay block 45 which is consenting. Then, we replay block 46 which is unfortunately again
non-consenting. In this situation we have to assume that this local snapshot has an issue, i.e.
it was corrupted externally. Thus, we reset the local table Foo to the second latest snapshot
Foo block 41. Now, we replay all blocks starting from block 42 up to block 46. This time block 46
is consenting.
In our implementation, we keep three committed snapshots per organizations. If replaying from
all of these snapshots does not lead to a consenting organization, then we can try to replay the
entire history. If even this fails, we have to assume that the ordering service acts maliciously
and can try again after starting a fresh ordering service, possibly by a different organization.
Notice that, of course, there is no 100% guarantee that any of these measures will lead to
a consenting organization. Severe problems such as a hardware error (in particular an error
that is not detected and transparently fixed by hardware or operating system itself) are out
of reach for repair by ChainifyDB. The important point here is that we detect the problem
early on (after every block of transactions and not only eventually), try to “rehabilitate” this
organization through recovery, and reintegrate it into the network.
Our recovery algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2 in the appendix.
6 Optimizations
Before we come to the experimental evaluation of ChainifyDB, let us discuss a set of interesting
optimizations.
6.1 Transaction Agreement
A powerful feature of ChainifyDB is that clients can propose arbitrary transactions to the
system. These transactions are then simply executed against the local DBMSs of the individual
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organizations without any restrictions. However, there might be situations where such a plain
execution without any restrictions is highly undesired by the organizations.
For example, consider the scenario where two organizations would like to log their mutual trades
in a shared table. A transaction inserting a trade could look as follows
INSERT INTO Trades(TID ,product ,amount ,totalprice)
VALUES (42," Gearbox " ,5 ,60000):
Obviously, this transaction is only meaningful if certain integrity constraints hold: The selling
organization must have enough products in stock (at least five gearboxes in our example) and
the buying organization must have enough money available (at least 60,000 in our example). To
enforce such integrity constraints, we prepend an optional agreement-subphase to our pipeline,
through which any transaction proposed to ChainifyDB must go first. Only if all involved
organizations agree to the proposed transaction, the transaction may enter the subsequent order-
phase.
To enable the optional agreement phase, two steps must be carried out by the organizations:
First, an agreement policy must be installed in consent when creating the shared table. It
specifies for the shared table which organizations have to agree upon a transaction operating
on that table. For our trading example, the policy of the table Trades could look as follows,
enforcing both involved organizations to decide for agreement:
AgreementPolicy(Trades) = { SellingOrganization , BuyingOrganization }
Second, each organization has to implement its individual integrity constraints, which are eval-
uated against each proposed transaction. Note that these constraints could be formulated to
compare the transaction against local data. For example, the agreements for the selling organi-
zation and the buying organization could look as follows:
SellingOrganization.agree(T) {
return T.amount <= Stocks.amount WHERE T.product == Stocks.product
}
BuyingOrganization.agree(T) = {
return T.totalprice <= Fund.availableMoney
}
Only if both organizations agree to a transaction operating on the Trades table, it is passed on
for further processing.
6.2 Iterative WLC-Setups
From a 10,000 feet perspective an agreement can be considered a different WLC-iteration where
the participants agree upon the string describing the SQL-transaction to be executed rather
than the outcome of running that transaction. This is visualized in Figure 8. In WLC 1 the
organizations must first agree upon a trade to be done (represented as an SQL-transaction). If
the organizations agree, a SQL string is inserted into a table PlannedTrades:
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1 INSERT INTO PlannedTrades(TID ,SQL_string)
VALUES (42," UPDATE line SET ..."):
If there is consent, that the tuple was inserted, i.e. that this trade should be done, the corre-
sponding SQL string will be send to WLC 2 which executes the SQL string.
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VALUES (42, 
"UPDATE line SET A = 5 WHERE B = 100;
 UPDATE line SET A = 8 WHERE B = 42;
 commit;“);
commit;
WLC 1 “transaction agreement“
WLC 2 “effect agreement“
Transaction:
UPDATE line SET A = 5 WHERE B = 100;
UPDATE line SET A = 8 WHERE B = 42;
commit;
consens on what?
table Trades changed!table Trades not changed!
append to 
Ledger
Figure 8: Transaction agreement can be regarded as running a separate pre-WLC phase on transaction
agreement before executing the actual transaction.
In summary, mapping subphases to incremental rounds of the WLC model enables interesting
abstractions. In future work, we plan to investigate these mappings in depth.
6.3 Parallel Transaction Execution
Apart from the interplay of the phases, we did not precisely specify how the execute-subphase
actually runs transactions in the underlying database system.
Naively, we could simply execute all valid transactions of a block one by one in a sequential
fashion. However, this strategy drastically wastes performance if the underlying system is able
to execute transactions in parallel.
This leads us to an alternative strategy, where we could simply submit all valid transactions
of a block to the underlying (potentially parallel) database system in one batch and let it
execute them concurrently. While this strategy leverages the performance of the underlying
system, it creates another problem: it is very likely that every DBMS schedules the same batch
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of transactions differently for parallel execution. As a consequence, the commit order of the
transactions likely differs across organizations, thus increasing the likelihood of non-consent.
The strategy we apply in ChainifyDB sits right between the previously mentioned strategies
and is inspired by the parallel transaction execution proposed in [35] and relates to the ideas
of [20, 15, 28]. When a block of transactions is received by the execute-subphase, we first identify
all existing conflict dependencies between transactions. This allows us to form mini-batches of
transactions, that can be executed safely in parallel, as they have no conflicting dependencies.
Let us see in detail how it works. The process can be decomposed into three phases:
(1) Semantic Analysis. First, for a block of transactions, we do a semantic analysis of each
transaction. Effectively, this means parsing the SQL statements and extracting the read and
write set of each transaction. These read and write sets are realized as intervals on the accessed
columns to support capturing both point query and range query accesses. For instance, assume
the following two single-statement transactions:
T1:UPDATE Foo SET A = 5 WHERE PK = 100;
T2:UPDATE Foo SET A = 8 WHERE PK > 42;
The extracted intervals for these transactions are:
T1: A is updated where PK is in [100 ,100]
T2: A is updated where PK is in [42, infinity]
(2) Creating the Dependency Graph. With the intervals at hand, we can create the depen-
dency graph for the block. For two transactions having a read-write, write-write, or write-read
conflict, we add a corresponding edge to the graph. Note that as transactions are inserted into
the dependency graph in the execution order given by the block, no cycles can occur in the
graph.
Let us extend the example from our Semantic Analysis Phase and let us assume, that T1 has
been added to the dependency graph already. By inspecting T2 we can determine that PK[42,
inf] overlaps with PK[100,100] of T1. As T2 is an update transaction, there is a conflict between
T2 and T1 and add a dependency edge from T1 to T2. Figure 9 presents an example dependency
graph for 9 transactions.
T3
T1
T6
T4
T5
T2
T8
T7
T9
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Figure 9: A topological sort of the dependency graph with k = 9 transactions yielding four execution
stages.
(3) Executing the Dependency Graph. Finally, we can start executing the transactions in
parallel. To do so, we perform topological sorting, i.e. we traverse the execution stages of the
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graph, that are implicitly given by the dependencies. Our example graph in Figure 9 has four
stages in total. Within one stage, all transactions can be executed in parallel, as no dependencies
exist between those transactions.
The actual parallel execution on the underlying database system is realized using k client con-
nections to the DBMS. To execute the transactions within an execution stage in parallel, the
k clients pick transactions from the stage and submit them to the underlying system. As our
method is conflict free, it guarantees the generation of serializable schedules.
Therefore we can basically switch off concurrency control on the underlying system. This can
be done by setting the isolation level of the underlying system to READ UNCOMMITTED1 [9]
to get the best performance out of the DBMS.
7 System Architecture
With a good knowledge of the logical design of ChainifyDB in Section 5, let us now map this
logical design to the physical architecture of ChainifyDB. A ChainifyDB network consists of
n (≥ 3) organizations, an untrusted OrderingServer, and a set of Kafka nodes that act as a
message broker to distribute the block created by the OrderingServer. The ChainifyDB system
is implemented using Golang and C++ as a primary language in just under 11,000 LOC, excluding
the dependencies and the generated code.
Each participating organization runs one or more instances of ChainifyServer, AgreementServer,
Execution- Server, and the ConsensusServer. Unless stated otherwise, we use the SHA256 hash-
ing algorithm from the crypto package, and the Sign and Verify algorithms from the elliptic
package of Golang 1.10.4. All messages exchanged between different components of the Chaini-
fyDB network are signed to preserve the integrity of the messages flowing in the system. And
unless stated otherwise, we use RPC calls [10, 34] to communicate between different components
of the system.
ChainifyServer: This component receives the signed transaction in the form of a proposal from
the client. Each ChainifyServer stores the policy that defines the set of organizations that must
agree to this transaction. Using this policy, the ChainifyServer communicates with the Agree-
mentServer of the responsible organizations to collect all the agreements required for this trans-
action. It then packs the original proposal and all the agreements into a ChainedTransaction.
If all agreements are valid, it forwards the ChainedTransaction to the OrderingServer. Each
organization can run multiple instances of ChainifyServer to linearly scale the number of client
requests handled by this organization.
AgreementServer: This component is responsible for validating the local integrity constraints
of the organization. It receives the transaction sent by the ChainifyServer using the RPC call,
decides whether this transaction passes the local integrity check, and responds with a signed
yes or no. The organization can run multiple instances of AgreementServer to linearly scale the
agreement-phase as well.
OrderingServer: This component receives the ChainedTransactions from the ChainifyServer
and packs them into a block in FIFO order. If the block has a sufficient size or a certain
1Note however, that typical MVCC-implementations do not provide this level, e.g. in PostgreSQL the weakest
isolation level possible is READ COMMITTED.
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amount of time has elapsed, the block is cut and forwarded to Apache Kafka The Kafka service
then delivers the block to all ExecutionServers. This component can be also scaled linearly to
accommodate the high frequency of incoming chained transactions.
ExecutionServer: This component fetches the blocks created by the OrderingServer and exe-
cutes them in-order on the underlying database system. The ExecutionServer first verifies all the
signatures to make sure that no one in the transaction pipeline tampered the transaction. If the
signatures and the agreements are valid, the transaction is marked as valid and invalid otherwise.
The ExecutionServer then forwards the block to the GraphGenerator implemented in C++, which
generates an efficient execution graph for this block as described in Section 6.3. After receiving
the optimized execution-graph, it is executed on the database system in parallel. During the
execution, ChainifyDB collects the digest of the execution using SQL 99 triggers. After the ex-
ecution of all transactions in the block, the ExecutionServer generates the LedgerBlock and the
corresponding LedgerBlockHash as described in Section 5.3, and forwards the LedgerBlockHash
to the ConsensusServer for the consensus round. The organization can run multiple instances
of this component to efficiently replicate the effects of the transactions on different database
systems inside the organization.
ConsensusServer: This component receives the Ledger Block and the LedgerBlockHash from
the ExecutionServer. It then communicates with other organization’s ConsensusServer to check
whether a particular LedgerBlockHash reaches consensus. On reaching consensus, the Consen-
susServer appends the corresponding LedgerBlock to the ledger. Otherwise, the organization
performs recovery.
In summary, all ChainifyDB components up to the ConsensusServer fall into the W-phase, while
the ConsensusServer itself falls into to the LC-phase. Note that if we purely follow the WLC
model, the transactions of the block could be excluded from the consensus round and from the
ledger, since technically, we do not care about how an organization reaches a state. However,
we still keep the information about the transactions per block to enable a more sophisticated
recovery phase.
8 Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate ChainifyDB we use the following system setup.
8.1 Setup and Workload
Type 1 (small): Two quad-core Intel Xeon CPU E5-2407 running at 2.2 GHz, equipped with
48GB of DDR3 RAM.
Type 2 (large): Two hexa-core Intel Xeon CPU X5690 running at 3.47 GHz, equipped with
192GB of DDR3 RAM.
Unless stated otherwise, we use a heterogeneous network consisting of three independent organi-
zations O1, O2, and O3. Organization O1 owns two machines of type 1, where PostgreSQL 11.2
is running on one of these machines. Organization O2 owns two machines of type 1 as well,
but MySQL 8.0.18 is running on one of them. Finally, organization O3 owns two machines of
type 2, where again PostgreSQL is running on one of the machines. The individual components
of ChainifyDB, as described in Section 7, are automatically distributed across the two machines
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of each organization. Additionally, there is a dedicated machine of type 2 that represents the
client firing transactions to ChainifyDB as well as a type 2 machine that solely runs the ordering
service.
As consensus policy, we configure two different options: In the first option Any-2 we set c = 2
such that at least two out of our three organizations have to produce the same effect to reach
consensus. In the second option All-3 we set c = 3 and consensus is reached only if all three
organizations produce the same effect. In any case, all three organizations have to agree to every
transaction. Besides, empirical evaluation revealed a block size of 4096 transactions to be a good
fit (see Section 8.5). Of course, we also activate parallel transaction execution as described in
Section 6.3.
As workload we use transactions from Smallbank [2], which simulate a typical asset transfer
scenario. To bootstrap the test, we create for 100,000 users a checking account and a savings
account each and initialize them with random balances. The workload consists of the following
four transactions: TransactSavings and DepositChecking increase the savings account and the
checking account by a certain amount. SendPayment transfers money between two given check-
ing accounts. WriteCheck decreases a checking account by a certain amount. During a single
run, we repeatedly fire these four transactions at a fire rate of 4096 transactions per client, where
we uniformly pick one of the transactions in a random fashion. For each picked transaction,
we determine the accounts to access based on a Zipfian distribution with a s-value of 1.1 and a
v-value of 1, unless stated otherwise.
8.2 Throughput
We start the experimental evaluation of ChainifyDB by inspecting the most important metric
of a blockchain system: the throughput of successful transactions, that make it through the
system.
Therefore, we first inspect the throughput of ChainifyDB in our heterogeneous setup under our
two different consensus policies Any-2 and All-3. Additionally to ChainifyDB, we show the
following two PBS baselines: (a) Vanilla Fabric [7] v1.2, probably the most prominent PBS
system currently. (b) Fabric++ [30], an improved version of Fabric v1.2. Both Fabric and
Fabric++ are also distributed across the same set of machines and the blocksize is set to 1024.
Figure 10(a) shows the results. On the x-axis, we vary the number of clients firing transactions
concurrently from 3 clients to 24 clients. On the y-axis, we show the average throughput of
successful transactions, excluding a ramp-up phase of the first five seconds. We can observe
that ChainifyDB using the Any-2 strategy shows a significantly higher throughput than Fab-
ric++ with up to almost 5000 transactions per second. In comparison, Fabric++ achieves only
around 1000 transactions per second, although it makes considerably more assumptions than
ChainifyDB: First, it assumes the ordering service to be trustworthy. Second, it assumes the
execution to be deterministic and therefore does not perform any consensus round on the state.
Regarding ChainifyDB, we can also observe that there is a large performance gap between the
Any-2 and the All-3 strategy. The reason for this lies in the heterogeneous setup we use. The
two organizations running PostgreSQL are able to process the workload significantly faster than
the single organization running MySQL. Thus, under the Any-2 strategy, the two organizations
using PostgreSQL are able to lead the progress, without having to wait for the significantly
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(a) Throughput of ChainifyDB with Any-2 and All-3 policy for varying number
of clients. Additionally, we evaluate Fabric [7] and Fabric++ [30]. We use the
Smallbank workload following a Zipf distribution.
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(b) Throughput of standalone MySQL and PostgreSQL for varying number of
clients. The same workload as in Figure 10(a) is fired using OLTP-bench. Note
that OLTP-bench follows a uniform distribution.
Figure 10: Throughput of successful transactions for the heterogeneous setup as described in Section 8.1.
slower third organization. Under the All-3 strategy, the progress is throttled by the slowest
organizations running MySQL.
The difference in processing speed also becomes visible, if we inspect the throughput of the
stand-alone single-instance database systems in Figure 10(b) under the same workload. This
time, we fire the transactions using OLTP-bench [14]. Note that both system are configured
22
with a buffer size of 2GB to keep the working set in main memory. As we can see, PostgreSQL
significantly outperforms MySQL under this workload independent of the number of clients.
There is one more observation we can make: By comparing Figure 10(a) and Figure 10(b) side-
by-side, we can see that ChainifyDB introduces only negligible overhead over the raw database
systems. In fact, for 3, 6, and 12 clients, ChainifyDB under the Any-2 policy actually produces
a slightly higher throughput than raw PostgreSQL. The reasons for this lies in our optimized
parallel transaction execution, which exploits the batch-wise inflow of transactions, and executes
the transaction at the lowest possible isolation level.
For completeness, we also show in Table 2 the throughput for Smallbank, where the accounts
are picked following a uniform distribution. As we can see, the throughput under a uniform
distribution is even higher with up to 6144 transactions per second than under the skewed Zipf
distribution, as it allows for a higher degree of parallelism during execution due to less conflicts
between transactions.
Distribution 3 Clients 6 Clients 12 Clients 24 Clients
Zipf 2757 TPS 3676 TPS 4709 TPS 4812 TPS
Uniform 2279 TPS 3840 TPS 5774 TPS 6144 TPS
Table 2: Average throughput of successful transactions for ChainifyDB (Any-2) under Smallbank follow-
ing a Zipf distribution and a uniform distribution.
8.3 Robustness and Recovery
Apart from the transaction processing performance, the robustness and recovery capabilities are
crucial properties of ChainifyDB as well. To put these capabilities to the test, in the following
experiment, we will disturb our ChainifyDB network in two different ways: First, we forcefully
corrupt the database of one organization and see whether ChainifyDB is able to detect and
recover from it. Afterwards, we bring down one organization entirely and see whether the
network is able to continue progressing. Of course, we are also interested in the performance of
the recovery processes.
Precisely, we have the following setup for this experiment: In the first phase, we sustain our
ChainifyDB network with transactions of the Smallbank workload. These do not cause the
organizations to deviate in any way. Consequently, this phase essentially resembles the standard
processing situation of ChainifyDB. Then, after a certain amount of time, we manually inject an
update to the table of organization O1 and see how fast O1 is able to recover from the deviation.
Note that we do not perform this update through a ChainifyDB transaction, but externally by
directly modifying the table in the database. Finally, we simulate a complete failure of one
organization by removing it from the network. The remaining two organizations then have to
reach consensus to be able to progress under the Any-2 policy.
In Figure 11(a), we visualize the progress of all organizations for our typical heterogeneous setup.
Additionally, in Figure 11(b), we test a homogeneous setup, where all three organizations run
PostgreSQL. On the x-axis, we plot the time of commit for each block. On the y-axis, we plot
the corresponding block IDs. Every five committed blocks, each organizations creates a local
checkpoint.
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Continues progressing as 
Organization 2 catches up.
(a) Heterogeneous Setup (2x PostgreSQL, 1x MySQL).
Organization 1: Recovery finishes
Organization 1: Deviation detected
Organization 2: 

Continues progressing as 
Organization 1 catches up.
Organization 3: Failure
Recovery starts
Organization 2: Stops progressing
(b) Homogeneous Setup (3x PostgreSQL).
Figure 11: Robustness and Recovery of ChainifyDB under the Any-2 consensus policy.
Let us start with our typical heterogeneous setup in Figure 11(a). First of all, we can observe that
the organizations O1 and O3, which run PostgreSQL, progress much faster than organization O2
running MySQL. Shortly after the update has been applied to O1, it detects the deviation in the
consensus round and starts recovery from the most recent checkpoint. Interestingly, this also
stops the progression of organization O3, as O3 is not able to reach consensus anymore according
to the Any-2 policy: O1 is busy with recovery and O2 is too far behind. As soon as O1 recovers,
which takes around 17 seconds, O3 also restarts progressing, as consensus can be reached again.
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Both O1 and O3 progress until we let O3 fail. Now, O1 can not progress anymore, as O3 is
not reachable and O2 still too far behind due its slow database system running underneath.
Thus, O1 halts until O2 has caught up. As soon as this is the case, both O1 and O2 continue
progressing at the speed of the slower organization, namely O2.
In Figure 11(b), we retry this experiment on a homogeneous setup, where all organization run
PostgreSQL. Thus, this time there is no drastically slower organization throttling the network.
Again, at a certain point in time, we externally corrupt the database of organization O1 by
performing an update and O1 starts to recover from the most recent checkpoint. In contrast
to the previous experiment, this time the recovery of O1 does not negatively influence any
other organization: O2 and O3 can still reach consensus under the Any-2 policy and continue
progressing, as none of the two is behind the other one. Recovery itself takes only around
4 seconds this time and in this case, another organization is ready to perform a consensus round
right after recovery. When organization O3 fails, O2 has to halt processing for a short amount
of time, as organization O1 has to catch up.
In summary, these experiments show (a) that we can detect state deviation and recover from
it, (b) that the network can progress in the presence of organization failures, (c) that all orga-
nizations respect the consensus policy at all times, and (d) that recover neither penalizes the
individual organizations nor the entire network significantly.
8.4 Cost Breakdown
In Section 8.2, we have seen the end-to-end performance of ChainifyDB. In the following, we
want to analyze how much individual components contribute to this performance.
Precisely, we want to investigate: (a) The cost of all cryptographic computation, such as signing
and validation, that is happening at several stages in the pipeline (see Section 7 for details).
(b) The impact of parallel transaction execution on the underlying database system (see Sec-
tion 6.3 for details).
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Figure 12: Cost breakdown of ChainifyDB.
25
Figure 12 shows the results. We can observe that the overhead caused by cryptographic compu-
tation is surprisingly small. Under the Any-2 policy, turning on all cryptographic components
decreases the throughput only by 7% for parallel execution. Under the All-3 policy, the decrease
is only 8.5%. While our cryptographic components have little negative effects, our parallel
transaction execution obviously has a very positive one. With activated cryptography, parallel
transaction execution improves the throughput by up to 5x.
8.5 Varying Blocksize
Finally, let us inspect the effect of the blocksize, which is an important configuration parameter
in any blockchain system. We vary the blocksize from 256 transactions per block in logarith-
mic steps up to 4096 transactions per block and report the average throughput of successful
transactions.
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Figure 13: The effect of varying the blocksize.
Figure 13 shows the results. We can see that both under the Any-2 and All-3 policy, the
throughput increases with the blocksize. This increase is mainly caused by our parallel transac-
tion execution mechanism, which analyzes the whole block of transactions and schedules them
for parallel conflict-free execution.
9 Conclusion
In this work, we introduced a highly flexible processing model for permissioned blockchain
systems called the Whatever-LedgerConsensus model. WLC avoids making assumptions on the
deterministic behavior of individual organizations by reaching consensus on the effects instead
of the actions. We clearly formalized WLC and discussed in detail the recovery options in that
landscape. To showcase the strengths of WLC, we proposed ChainifyDB, an implementation of
a blockchain layer, which is able to chainify arbitrary data management systems and connect
them in a network. In an extensive experimental evaluation, we showed that ChainifyDB does
not only offer a 6x higher throughput than comparable baselines, but also introduces a robust
recovery mechanism, which grant organizations the chance to rehabilitate.
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A Algorithms
1 """
2 Function to run consensus for a given block in ChainifyDB.
3
4 Parameters:
5 @block_id: The id of the block for which the consensus should run
6 @local_hash: The locally computed hash_digest of this block
7 @orgs: List of organizations participating in the chainifydb ’s network
8 @policy: Consensus policy specifying the number of organizations that must agree during
consensus round
9 """
10 func consensus(block_id , local_hash , orgs[], policy) {
11
12 // A hash mapping the hash_digest to the number of
13 // organisations who computed this hash_digest
14 digest_map := map[key: digest , value: count]
15
16 // insert local hash_digest into the map
17 digest_map[local_hash_digest] = 1
18
19 // get every organisation ’s hash_digest for this block
20 foreach org in organisations {
21
22 // get hash_digest and signature
23 hash_digest , sign = org.get_hash_digest(block_id)
24
25 // verify if the digest is properly signed
26 if sign.Verify(hash_digest , signature , org.PubKey) {
27 digest_map[hash_digest] += 1
28 }
29 }
30
31 // check if the consensus is reached
32 for hash , count in digest_map {
33 if count >= policy.K && hash == local_hash {
34 // consensus has been reached
35 // and local node is consenting
36 return hash , true
37 } else {
38 // consensus reached
39 // but this node is non -consenting
40 return hash , false // start recovery
41 }
42 }
43
44 // no consensus has been reached
45 return nil , false
46 }
Algorithm 1: ChainifyDB consensus mechanism executed by each organization individually.
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1 """
2 Function to perform recovery of an organization.
3
4 Parameters:
5 @non_consenting_block_id:
6 The id of the block that caused non -consenting
7 @blocks:
8 The history of blocks up to the non -consenting one
9 @table: The table that is non -consenting
10 @local_snapshots:
11 The locally committed snapshots , ordered from newest to oldest
12 """
13 func recoverNode(non_consenting_block_id ,
14 blocks ,
15 table ,
16 local_snapshots) {
17 // Assumption: the last block executed by this
18 // organization was non -consenting.
19
20 // try restoring from local snapshots from newest
21 // to oldest
22 while(local_snapshots) {
23 // get newest snapshot
24 snapshot = local_snapshots.popNewest ()
25 // copy snapshot to table
26 table = snapshot
27 // replay all blocks up to (including) the
28 // non -consenting one
29 replay(table , blocks , snapshot.block_id + 1,
30 non_consenting_block_id)
31 // if the table is now consenting , we are done
32 if(isConsenting(table)) return true
33 }
34
35 // non available snapshot lead to a consenting table
36 // thus , replay the entire history
37 replay(table , blocks , 0, non_consenting_block_id)
38 if(isConsenting(table)) return true
39
40 // the organization is still non -consenting
41 // so exclude it from the network
42 return false
43 }
44
45 // helper procedure to replay all blocks specified
46 // in a range
47 func replay(table , blocks , begin_block_id , end_block_id){
48 for(b = begin_block_id; b <= end_block_id; b++) {
49 table.execute(blocks[b])
50 }
51 }
Algorithm 2: ChainifyDB’s recovery algorithm in pseudo-code.
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